Bloom filter encoded identifiers are increasingly used for privacy preserving record linkage applications, because they allow for errors in encrypted identifiers. However, little research on the security of Bloom filters has been published so far. In this paper, we formalize a successful attack on Bloom filters composed of bigrams. The attack is based on subtle filtering and elementary statistical analysis. Finally, we describe modifications of the Bloom filters for preventing similar attacks.
Introduction
Linking databases containing information on individual characteristics and behavior is of increasing scientific and commercial interest. In many applications, linking databases has to be done without a unique personal number. Hence, due to privacy concerns, privacy preserving record linkage is used most often. In this context encrypted personal quasiidentifiers such as first names, surnames, as well as date and place of birth should identify identical records in different databases. However, quasi-identifiers usually contain errors; therefore, linking of exact matching identifiers is usually unacceptable. To allow for errors in encrypted identifiers, special techniques such as encrypted phonetic codes are commonly used. For example, many European cancer registries outside of the Scandinavian countries use encrypted Soundex codes as substitutes for cases with nonmatching exact identifiers. Because the information retrieval properties of encrypted phonetic codes are far from perfect, a number of privacy preserving record linkage techniques have been suggested in the last 10 years. One of these techniques is based on Bloom filters [14] .
Bloom filter-based record linkage has been used in real-world medical applications, such as in Australia [12] , Brazil [9] , Germany [16] , and Switzerland [6] . A recent study based on healthcare databases with more than 26 million records has shown that privacy preserving record linkage using Bloom filters can be done without difference in linkage quality compared with traditional probabilistic methods using fully unencrypted personal identifiers [12] . However, the widespread use of Bloom filters is hampered by the fact that currently no comprehensive cryptanalysis of Bloom filters in record linkage is available. For example, the British Office for National Statistics considered several methods for linking administrative data within the Beyond 2011 Programme, but refrained from all "(. . . ) recent innovations, such as bloom filter encryption (. . . )" since they "(. . . ) have not been fully explored from an accreditation perspective" [10] . We hope our contribution will be helpful for such accreditation processes.
Background
Bloom filters were introduced by B. H. Bloom in 1970 [1] as an efficient data structure for checking set memberships. A Bloom filter is defined as a bit array of length m, initially filled with zeros. To store a given set S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } of items in a Bloom filter, each element is mapped with k different hash functions h 1 , . . . , h k , whereupon each hash function maps its input to an integer h j (s i ) := x i,j , where 0 ≤ x i,j ≤ m − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and k, m, n positive integers. Afterward, the bit position in the Bloom filter corresponding to x i,j is set to one. A bit location can be set to one multiple times and it retains this value. To check whether an item t is contained in S, it is mapped with the same k hash functions. Hence, if the bit positions h 1 (t), . . . , h k (t) in the Bloom filter are all set to one, then t is presumably a member of S. Nevertheless, there is a probability for false positive results, which means the check indicates t ∈ S, although this is not the case. False positives occur when the ones on positions h 1 (t), . . . , h k (t) are caused by different s i . However, if the two Bloom filters differ in at least one bit position, t definitely does not belong to S. In the recent past, many variations of Bloom filters have been developed, which are used in a wide range of applications, such as spell checking, encrypted search, and database applications. A short overview is given in ref. [11] .
Application of Bloom filters in Privacy Preserving Record Linkage
Recently, Bloom filters have been used for record linkage applications, especially for the matching of large-scale medical databases. In 2009, this approach for conducting privacy preserving record linkage was presented in [14] . In the suggested protocol, two data custodians A and B at first agree upon a password. Then they standardize the identifiers, pad them with blanks at the beginning and the end, and split them into substrings of two characters, called bigrams. Next, each bigram of an identifier is mapped through multiple password-dependent hash functions to a Bloom filter. By computing the similarity of the Bloom filters, the similarity of the encoded identifiers can be approximated. Hence, through calculation of the similarity between two encrypted records, record linkage based on Bloom filters allows for errors in the encrypted data. Because each identifier is handled with a separate Bloom filter, any standard record linkage software (for example, G-Link by Statistics Canada) can be used if a function for computing similarities of binary vectors is available. Therefore, the approach can be used for large data sets as they are common in national medical databases [12] .
Attacks on Bloom filters
Only two studies addressing attacks on Bloom filters in privacy preserving record linkage have been published so far. Kuzu et al. [7] sampled 20,000 records from the North Carolina voter registration list and encrypted the bigrams of forenames using 15 hash functions and a Bloom filter length of 500 bits. They formulated their attack as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). To do this, the variables and their domains were determined by a frequency analysis of the identifiers from the voter registration list and of the Bloom filter encodings. To assign possible forenames to the Bloom filters, Kuzu et al. generated frequency intervals for the forenames in the voting list and for the Bloom filters. Furthermore, they filtered the number of possible bits that could be set for a name, to restrict the number of alternative names that could correspond to a Bloom filter. Thus, they showed under strong assumptions that Bloom filter encodings are vulnerable in principle. More precisely, the 400 most frequent names of approximately 3, 500 different forenames were assigned correctly, which corresponds to 11% of the database. However, their assumptions that (1) the encrypted records are a random sample of a known resource and (2) the adversary has access to the resource from which the sample is drawn are rarely given in practical applications. Hence, in their second paper, Kuzu et al. [8] took a more critical look at the practical use of their own attack for real-world data sets, because the distribution of personal identifiers such as those from a medical database is unlikely to generate a random sample. Thus, they investigated the influence of different public resources (voter registration records) on the extent to which real personal identifiers (from the Vanderbilt University Medical Center) could be disclosed, when the latter are not a proper random sample of the first. After some modifications to the attack and restricting the problem to the set of only the 20 most frequent names, the CSP assigned four of those 20 names correctly. Therefore, Kuzu et al. [8] concluded that their attack remains feasible in practice but with lower precision and higher computational costs as in their previous paper.
Our contribution
In this paper, we attack a database of encrypted German surnames. These surnames are considered to be a random sample of a specific population, but in contrast to the assumptions in ref. [7] , we do not suppose that the attacker knows the global data set from which this random sample is drawn. The adversary knows only a publicly available list of the most common surnames in Germany. Furthermore, the attack described in this paper uses an entirely different approach than the one presented in ref. [7] . Instead of considering whole names, the attack is based completely on subtle filtering of bigrams and analyzing which bigrams could appear in a particular Bloom filter. In contrast to the computationally intensive solution of a constraint satisfaction problem as described in refs. [7] and [8] , our attack uses considerably less computational effort. Finally, we are not interested in the demonstration that some names could be identified correctly, but in recovering as many names as possible from the Bloom filters.
Encrypting names with Bloom filters
In this section we introduce some basic notation and describe the encrypting procedure. We start with a definition of the underlying alphabet and the encryption function. We call an element b ∈ Σ n n-gram and bigram if n = 2. Further, we define a hash function as a mapping f from the set of bigrams into the set of nonnegative integers smaller than m:
A hash function always maps the same bigram to the same integer value. Furthermore, if the hash function is unknown, e.g., if it is dependent on a cryptographic key, the bigram cannot be deduced from its hash value.
As proposed in ref. [5] , we derive the hash values for k hash functions H j from a linear combination of the hash values of two hash functions g and h by
Next we define the basic structure of our encryptions, Bloom filters.
Definition 3.2. Let m, n ∈ N and b ∈ Σ 2 be a bigram. We define the Bloom filter B(b) as the bit array of length m given by
where
In the following, Bloom filters that are generated from bigrams are called atoms. Hence, Bloom filters as well as atoms denote bit arrays of length m. Furthermore, at most k positions in an atom are set to one, because each bigram is subject to each hash function. The Bloom filter of a name is the combination of the atoms corresponding to the bigrams of the name, by using the bitwise OR operation:
where is the bitwise OR operation and NAME denotes a standardized name. As an example, we consider the most common German surname: MUELLER. 0000100 . . . 0000010 Initial setting: In the original setup, a semi-trusted third party conducts the record linkage process between two Bloom filter encrypted databases. In our concrete example, a data set containing Bloom filters was assumed to be sent to such a third party, which acts as the adversary in our model. The adversary has knowledge of the encryption process, but does not know the key. For the attack, we generated 10,000 Bloom filters built from German surnames with the frequency of each name approximately corresponding to the frequency of surnames in the German population. Before encryption, the names were standardized (removal of unusual characters and punctuation), as is common practice in record linkage [13] . Finally, the names were padded with blanks so that the alphabet is given by the letters A-Z and an additional blank. For the encryption we used Bloom filters of length m = 1,000, built from bigrams, which were encrypted with k = 15 hash functions 1 , generated as described in Eq.
(1).
Cryptanalysis of the Bloom filters
This section provides a detailed description of the deciphering process. At first we reduce the number of Bloom filters, then we investigate which atoms may be contained in each of the remaining Bloom filters. Finally, we assign bigrams to these atoms and reassemble the encrypted surnames from them.
Assumptions:
The hash functions g and h are dependent on a cryptographic key, which is unknown to the attacker, but the attacker knows about the double hashing scheme. Our aim is to reconstruct the original surnames. Note that our deciphering process does not depend on the length of the Bloom filters m, nor the number of hash functions k, nor on the used hash functions themselves.
Sorting and counting Bloom filters
First, we sorted and deduplicated the given Bloom filters, resulting in 7,580 unique ones. The three most frequent Bloom filters occurred 67, 50, and 30 times. Altogether, 934 of the 10,000 Bloom filters existed at least twice. Only this subset was used for further analysis to prevent problems caused by rare names and rare bigrams. In the following, the most frequent 934 Bloom filters will be denoted by B i (i ∈ {0, . . . , 933}), where B 0 is the most frequent one.
Enumerating possible atoms
Atoms are the results of linear combinations of two hash functions g and h. For a specific input, let x and y be the hash values of g and h, respectively. Then it holds that x, y ∈ {0, . . . , 999} and we define B(x, y) = (b 0 , . . . , b 999 ) as before by
Hence, for each bigram b, there exist x and y with B(b) = B(x, y), even though this representation does not need to be unique. For example, B(0, 250) and B(0, 750) both lead to atoms in which the positions 0, 250, 500, and 750 are set to one. Because we only knew the given Bloom filters of the surnames, but did not know the hash functions used, we generated every possible atom. As x, y ∈ {0, . . . , 999} holds, a pairwise combination of x and y resulted in a multiset M of 1,000 2 = 1,000,000 possible atoms. The next step was testing which atoms actually occurred in the 934 most frequent Bloom filters. 
Filtering phantom atoms
We first introduce the Hamming weight of a Bloom filter, which simply corresponds to the number of ones in the Bloom filter. 
Example 4.1 motivates that the Hamming weight of many phantom atoms is less than the maximum possible weight k of an atom, which is equal to 15 in our case. Therefore, the number of atoms with Hamming weight 15 was determined and only these atoms were used for further analyses. This approach resulted in 805 possible atoms 2 and could implicate two problems concerning the filtering of true atoms and the remaining phantom atoms.
Problem 1: Real atoms could be removed erroneously from the set.
This case is unlikely, because a randomly generated atom has Hamming weight 15 with high probability. More precisely, in our specific case the probability of generating an atom with Hamming weight 15 is equal to p = 984 1000 = 0.984. Thus, the probability that an arbitrary (but fixed) real atom is filtered is equal to 1 − p = 16 1000 = 0.016 (for details, see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A). Consequently, the expected number of erroneously filtered real atoms is equal to 27 2 · 16 1000 ≈ 11.7. Later assignments of atoms to bigrams showed that the most frequent atoms like B(ER) or B(CH) were indeed not filtered. However, we found that the atom of the bigram HA was filtered by the restriction. Although this is a frequent atom, its filtering had no negative influence on the deciphering process. 
Sorting possible atoms
For each of the remaining possible atoms B(x, y), we determined the number of Bloom filters B i , i ∈ {0, . . . , 933} containing these atoms. The atoms were then numbered from a 0 to a 804 according to their frequency, in which the most frequent atom is indexed by zero. Initially, we assumed that the phantom atoms appear rarely and therefore were assigned to high numbers. It turned out that this is correct to a large extent. Nevertheless, some atoms with low numbers (such as 52, 68, and 80) turned out to be phantom atoms.
Assignment of atoms to bigrams
At first, we identified the most frequent bigrams in different lists of German surnames. In all of the lists, the three most frequent bigrams were ER, R and CH (because of padding of the surnames, we distinguished between beginning letters, i.e., R, and ending letters, i.e., R ). Next we assigned these particular bigrams to the three most frequent atoms: a 0 → ER, a 1 → R , and a 2 → CH. Because we knew that SCH is a common German prefix combined from the bigrams S, SC, and CH, we determined which atoms generally occur together with atom number two for CH, and hence assigned these ones to S and SC. We proceeded likewise with the frequent combination of bigrams in MANN. We then guessed names from the completed assignments of bigrams to atoms, looked up common bigrams from our frequency analysis, and thus found further mappings between frequent bigrams and atoms. The free encyclopedia Wikipedia listed as the most frequent German surnames the names MUELLER and SCHMIDT. The common bigrams in our first two Bloom filters indicated that these corresponded to MUELLER and SCHMIDT. The Wikipedia list also contained four different spellings of the name MEYER. Thus, we compared several spellings of common German surnames such as MEYER with respect to identical atoms and determined further assignments of atoms to bigrams. A detailed description of this procedure is given in Appendix B. However, the ranks of frequencies for our list of encrypted names did not correspond exactly to the frequency rank in the Wikipedia list of the most common German surnames. For example, we identified the name NGUYEN as Bloom filter B 73 , but in the list from Wikipedia it appears at position 815. Note that these assignments strongly depended on our knowledge of German surnames as well as good guessing. To verify our assumptions, we used a statistical analysis of surnames, based on Hamming weights.
Statistical analysis based on Hamming weights
Based on names from a German telephone CD, we extracted approximately 700,000 surnames as an additional verification for the correctness of our assignments. Next we chose two arbitrary different hash functions g and h, and computed the string lengths L(NAME) as well as the Hamming weight HW (B(NAME)) of each corresponding Bloom filter. Then, for a fixed Hamming weight of some Bloom filter, we counted the string length l of the corresponding names and l showed only a small variance. For example, there were 5,003 names for which the Hamming weight of the corresponding Bloom filter had a value of 150. The string length of these names varied between l = 9 and l = 15. The average was 10.17 with variance 0.21. Hence, we concluded that a name with Hamming weight 150 of the corresponding Bloom filter has a string length of l = 10. We then computed the Hamming weights of our most frequent Bloom filters B 0 , . . . , B 933 and found that B 0 and B 1 had Hamming weights 111 and 113, respectively. Based on the mentioned statistics, these Hamming weights correspond to names with string length l = 7. Because the most frequent surnames MUELLER and SCHMIDT both consist of seven letters each, we substantiated our assumption and assigned B 0 = B(MUELLER) and B 1 = B(SCHMIDT). Overall, the Hamming weights are a good indicator for the lengths of the names encoded in a Bloom filter.
Discussion
In this paper we have demonstrated a successful attack on basic Bloom filters as used in privacy preserving record linkage applications. In contrast to previous research, very little computational effort is needed and only publicly available name frequency lists are used for this form of attack. The attack concentrates on the frequency of bigrams as the building blocks of Bloom filters instead of the frequency of entire names. Therefore, the attack described in this paper can be used for the deciphering of a whole database instead of only a small subset of the most frequent names, as in previous research. Because very little computational effort and only a frequency distribution of bigrams are needed for a successful attack, it is conceivable to develop a fully automatic deciphering algorithm based on the presented procedure. In summary, we must conclude that basic Bloom filters using only one identifier per Bloom filter are not suited for encrypting sensitive personal data and should not be used for applications requiring strong security guarantees. However, the enumeration of possible atoms in our analysis (cf. section 4.2) depends on the special composition of hash functions as described in Eq. (1). We believe that modifying the construction scheme of the hash functions offers a higher level of security against the attack described in this paper. Altogether, several options for modifying basic Bloom filters are conceivable:
Randomly selected hash values An attacker's background knowledge will be minimal if the k hash functions h 0 , . . . , h k−1 are randomly sampled from the set of all functions that map the bigram set Σ 2 to {0, . . . , 999}. Thereby, the cardinality of the set of possible atoms increases. For example, for the parameters considered in our concrete example (L = 1,000, k = 15), the number of candidate atoms increases from 493,975 (when using the double hashing scheme) to approximately 6.9876 ·10 32 when permitting arbitrary hash functions. Therefore, as a first modification to basic Bloom filters, we strongly suggest the use of random independent hash functions for applications. In this case, applying the described attack is not promising. To be more precise, an entirely new approach for the detection of atoms has to be invented.
Modification of identifiers
Further options for hardening Bloom filters are modifications of the identifiers, such as deletion or sampling of bigrams for long names. Shortening the identifiers will prevent the identification of longer names. Furthermore, omitting the padding of bigrams makes the identification of starting and ending letters much harder.
Salting Salting describes the process of generating hash values that depend on a recordspecific key. In record linkage scenarios, short identifiers such as date or year of birth are obvious natural candidates for such a key. Then, for a single bigram b appearing in two names, the same bit positions will be set to one in the corresponding Bloom filters only if the keys coincide. If the keys are not equal, it is unlikely that all hash values for the bigram b are the same.
Inserting random bits Adding random bits to Bloom filters should have no serious effect on their similarities, but it will prevent any attack using deterministic constraints only. Furthermore, in an attack as described in this paper, fewer phantom atoms could be filtered, so that altogether more atoms appear in each of the most frequent Bloom filters.
Fake injections
The proposed attack strongly depends on comparing the observed frequencies of atoms and expected bigram frequencies. The expected bigram frequencies are highly skewed. 3 Hence, the success of an attack can be reduced if the frequency distribution of bigrams is modified artificially. This could be achieved, for example, by the insertion of random strings that contain rare bigrams. Thus, the overall frequency distribution of hashed bigrams will be closer to a uniform distribution, which makes a correct assignment of atoms to bigrams more difficult. In ref. [4] , three such fake injection methods were described in the context of phonetic codes. Neither of the methods is without serious drawbacks. However, it should not be hard to adopt similar approaches to the Bloom filters.
Using a single Bloom filter for all identifiers The use of a single Bloom filter for storing all identifiers (Cryptographic Longterm Key, CLK ) was first suggested in 2011, [15] . Because not only bigrams from first names and surnames, but also bigrams from numerical variables such as date of birth and additional identifiers like place of birth are hashed with different hash functions to the same bit array, it becomes more difficult for an attacker to detect repetitive patterns, even in sets of Bloom filters. By increasing the probability that the same pattern of positions in a Bloom filter could be set by different bigrams from different identifiers, 4 attacking a single Bloom filter of the kind used for CLKs will further impede CSP attacks as described in ref. [7] . For example, Kuzu et al. [8] reported that they failed in attacking data structures such as CLKs with their CSP attack. Therefore, we consider the use of the CLK approach as the most promising modification of Bloom filters to prevent attacks.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated a successful attack on basic Bloom filters using only one identifier per Bloom filter. Therefore, this specific form of encoding identifiers should not be used for applications requiring strong security guarantees. However, we suggested a list of modifications that make attacks as described in this paper more difficult. At least one modification (salting) has not been mentioned in the previous PPRL literature. Neither this technique nor the effects of the other modifications have been studied in the context of attacks on privacy preserving record linkage. Because the number of alternatives to Bloom filters in PPRL is quite limited, further research on the cryptographic properties of modified Bloom filters is desirable.
A Probability of the event HW (a) = 15
We are interested in the probability that a randomly chosen atom generated according to the rule in Eq. (2) has a maximal Hamming weight equal to k. A high probability for this event implies a small probability for filtering true atoms in the deciphering process. We assume that the hash values of g and h are independent and uniformly distributed on {0, . . . , m − 1}.
Lemma A.1. Let k, m ∈ N be positive integers. Assume that x and y are independent and identically distributed according to the uniform distribution on {0, . . . , m − 1}. We define I(x, y) := {x + iy mod m : i = 0, . . . , k − 1}. Then, for the probability of the event Hence, the probability that a randomly generated atom has Hamming weight k = 15 is equal to p = Given all previous assignments, the following atoms could be assigned: a 141 → UL, a 153 → LZ.
At this point, the name SCHULZ has been found among the Bloom filters. All of its bigrams could be deciphered. By using similar arguments, all 934 names and their corresponding bigrams could be detected successfully. 
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